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Abstract  
The private sector is deemed as an engine of growth. As such, many developing countries 
including Ghana have sought to develop the private sector to propel the growth of their 
economies. This notwithstanding, much has not been done to examine the effects of such 
efforts on the productivity of firms in relation to trade reforms in the context of the private 
sector. This paper contributes to the trade literature by examining how tariffs affect the 
productivity of manufacturing firms in Ghana’s private sector using firm-level data from 
1991 to 2001. In the first step, productivity is estimated via the Levisohn-Petrin approach 
in order to correct for the well-known simultaneity and selection biases. In the second 
step, the effect of tariffs on the derived productivity is analysed. The findings suggest 
that lower tariffs are associated with a decline in the productivity of Ghanaian private 
firms in the manufacturing sector.  
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Subject classification codes: D24, F1, F13, F14, F23, O14 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
Introduction 
In Africa, the private sector contributes over 80% to total production and employs about 90% 
of the working age population (AfDB 2011). It is therefore essential in fighting poverty and 
ensuring inclusive growth (DFID 2008; OECD 2007). Hence, a well-developed private sector 
plays an important role in the development process of developing countries through job 
creation, public revenue generation, better wages, poverty reduction and improving living 
conditions. In spite of its contributions, the private sector was neglected by several African 
countries at independence including Ghana.   
In the early post-independent Ghana, a centrally planned economy was adopted coupled 
with State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) that were backed by import substitution strategies. In 
this regard, higher tariffs were imposed on imports as well as quotas that restricted the 
quantities of imports. However, this has not been very successful as such strategies proved to 
be unsustainable (AfDB 2011) in most African countries. As a result, an attempt has been made 
in Ghana through reforms sponsored by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) to make the private sector a key partner in the development of the country.  
The reforms sought to promote manufacturing industries and an outward looking 
economy backed by the private sector. Trade liberalization was part of such reforms in Ghana 
and meant to open up the once protected and inward-looking economy. In this respect, import 
controls were abolished, exchange rates deregulated, and state enterprises privatized. The 
country has maintained a credible commitment to trade reforms over the years. However, much 
is not known about how such trade reforms has impacted on the performance of the private 
sector in Ghana. According to Buffie (2001), trade policy research in developing countries 
abound on advocacy but very short on empirical evidence. For this reason, this paper examines 
the impact of trade liberalization on the productivity of private firms in Ghana’s manufacturing 
sector using firm-level data. Specifically, the paper investigates the extent to which tariff 
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reductions have contributed either to a rise or decline in the productivity of private 
manufacturing firms between 1991 and 2001. Also, it investigates performance differences 
between importers vs. non-importers and exporters vs. non-exporters. Finally, it analyses 
whether firm ownership type that is foreign or domestic play a role in delivering superior firm 
performance. 
Even though studies on trade and firm productivity abound, several of them have not 
focused on the private sector and a few others have been either at the industry (Fatou and Choi 
2013; Bigsten and Gebreeyesus 2009; Amiti and Konnings 2007) or cross-country level 
(Bresnahan et al. 2016; Foster-Mcgregor et al. 2013; Söderbom et al. 2006). Furthermore, 
several studies have used macro data, which is not sufficiently informative as trade is said to 
be undertaken by firms but not countries (Hallak and Levinsohn 2008). Hence, “country level 
data are not granular enough to capture how trade impacts firms and households around the 
globe” (Hallak and Levinsohn 2008,217). Such aggregate data according to Kasahara and 
Rodrigue (2008) does not capture heterogeneity across different firms in an economy. It is 
therefore necessary to first examine changes at the firm-level as done in the present paper in 
order to have a better understanding of the changes on the aggregate level.   
Amid the continuous calls for liberalization in the developing world, this paper is useful 
to policy makers in their trade policies especially with regards to either increasing or decreasing 
tariffs. The paper therefore contributes to knowledge in the framework of developing country 
studies in the area of trade and firm efficiency. The rest of the paper is structured as follows: 
The next section provides a brief background on the economic performance of Ghana over the 
period. Section 3 presents the empirical literature on trade and productivity. The data employed 
and the empirical models are outlined in section 4. In section 5, the empirical results are 
reported and section 6 presents the conclusions.  
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Background 
The economic performance of Ghana since independence can be categorized into three phases: 
Immediate post-colonial period / Independence (1957 – 1966), post-Nkrumah/Era of coup 
d’états (1966 -1982) and 1983 to present (era of economic restoration and development). The 
first period had an average economic growth of about 4.5% per annum coupled with relatively 
low inflation rates (Anaman and Osei-Amponsah, 2009). This period witnessed the 
establishment of several state industries across the country: the setting up of the Ghana 
Industrial Holding Corporation (GIHOC) and the development of the Akosombo hydroelectric 
dam and the new township and industrial city around the Tema port. Hence, Anaman and Osei-
Amponsah (2009) opine that Nkrumah’s regime made the initial attempts to industrialize 
Ghana. The immediate post-colonial period was therefore characterized by inward-looking 
policies of import substitution industrialization and the dominance of state enterprises.  
The second phase was home to political instability with the frequent change of 
governments via coup d’états. In fact, there were 4 coup d’états and 7 Heads of State within 
this period Therefore, the industrialization efforts of the previous period were largely 
abandoned. Furthermore, frequent changes in policies brought about a lack of policy direction.  
The third phase is a period marked by political stability, moderate economic growth of 
about 4.8% per annum alongside moderate inflation rates and trade liberalization. This period 
witnessed the major stages of Ghana’s outward-oriented economy. That is, the transition to 
import liberalization in 1983 and the liberalized trade regime since 1990. A major feature of 
this phase was the shift to the private sector as the backbone of the Ghanaian economy, which 
resulted in the privatization of state enterprises. Therefore, improving the attractiveness of the 
private sector and stimulating private investments were key at this stage. To that end, corporate 
income tax rate applicable to manufacturing firms was reduced from 45% to 35% in 1991. 
Also, corporate tax rebate on exports was raised from 25% to 30%.  
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With regards to trade, import duty on semi-processed intermediate goods was reduced 
to 10% from 15% in 1991 whilst all quantitative restrictions on imported raw materials for 
export manufacturers were eliminated. A 100% duty drawback on imported inputs was 
introduced and custom duty on textile imports was reduced to 10% from 40% (World Bank, 
1991). In terms of strides in the political arena of Ghana, this period witnessed the conduct of 
democratic election in 1992 that returned the country to multiparty system and bringing about 
participatory governance/decision making. 
By this time, the import licensing system had been abolished and the once highly 
controlled exchange rate deregulated. Documentation requirements for both imports and 
exports were also simplified. Hence, it is argued that Ghana’s trade policy began at this point 
“to reflect a strong belief in international competitiveness, and the recognition that 
protectionism and import controls can only prevent the levels of economic growth associated 
internationally with competition-induced structural Change” (GATT 1992,13). A policy 
objective of government during this period was to lower average tariffs to below 10%. Until 
January 2000, Ghana had a four-tier tariff structure with rates of zero, 5%, 10% and 20%. 
Mostly, raw materials and capital goods attracted rates of zero and 5% whilst intermediate and 
consumer goods mostly had rates of 10% and 20% respectively. The simple average Most 
Favoured Nation (MFN) tariff fell to 13% by January 2000 from 17% in 1992 (WTO, 2001).  
It is in this vein that this paper seeks to assess the effect of tariffs on the productivity of private 
firms in Ghana. 
Empirical Literature on the Productivity Effects of Trade 
It has been argued that the existing literature on opening up, either through reductions in tariffs 
or quota points to associated productivity gains (De Loecker 2011). For example, Bigsten et al. 
(2009) found large positive effects of tariff reductions on productivity from their study of 
manufacturing firms in Ethiopia covering 1997 – 2005. In particular, they indicate that 
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excessive tariff levels may be distortionary. Still on Ethiopia, Abreha, (2014) found 
productivity gains from importing using data of manufacturing firms from 1996 to 2011. His 
findings reveal that importers perform better and also provide evidence that supports learning-
by-importing. Furthermore, the results of Bigsten et al. (2016) using firm-level manufacturing 
data from Ethiopia confirm that tariff reductions on intermediate inputs result in higher 
productivity gains.  
Similarly, a study of manufacturing firms in Ghana by Ackah et al. (2012) found a large 
positive effect of tariff reductions on total factor productivity. Likewise, Nyantakyi and 
Munemo (2014) concluded from their study of manufacturing firms in three Sub-Saharan 
countries (Ghana, Kenya and Tanzania) that firm performance will improve if tariffs on 
imported capital goods are eliminated. Using firm and industry level data, their results suggest 
that further improvements in access to foreign technology via trade liberalization could result 
in significant productivity improvements of technically incompetent firms.  
Studies on the tariff-productivity nexus in other countries aside Africa also point to similar   
conclusions. For instance, Amiti and Konings (2007) found from their study of Indonesian 
firms that a 10-percentage point decrease in input tariffs leads to a 12 percent productivity gain 
for firms that import inputs. They also indicate that the gains from input tariff reductions are at 
least twice as high as any gains from reducing output tariffs. Similarly, a study by Topalova 
and Khandelwal (2011) on the effect of trade liberalization on productivity suggest that both 
lower tariffs on inputs and final goods did increase firm-level productivity in India with input 
tariffs having the larger impacts. In a similar way, Hansen (2010a) revealed that a 10-
percentage point fall in tariff rates resulted in up to 2 percent total factor productivity gains in 
his analysis of the impact of tariff cuts within the Eastern European enlargement on German 
and Austrian firm productivity. He concludes that tariff reductions significantly raised the 
productivity of parent firms.  
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Additionally, Pavnick (2002) found that trade liberalization led to within plant 
productivity improvements in Chile for plants in the import-competing sector. Another study 
using firm-level Chilean manufacturing longitudinal data by Kashara and Rodrigue (2008) 
revealed positive impact of imported intermediates on plant level productivity using four 
different estimators of With-in Group estimator, the system GMM estimator and the Olley-
Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) estimators. They suggest that productivity is 
improved with foreign intermediate imports. These results conform to the findings of 
Fernandes (2007) that tariff liberalization has a strong positive impact on plant productivity 
although stronger for larger plants and those in less competitive industries. 
Ge et al. (2011) also found from their study of Chinese firms covering 2000 - 2006, that 
a 1% decrease in input tariff resulted in an increase in total import value by 3.1%, an increase 
in intermediate inputs by 2.6% and a 4.3% increase in the value of imported capital goods. On 
the link between intermediate imports and productivity, they reveal that a 10% increase in 
imported intermediate value led to an increase in total factor productivity of 0.5% whilst a 10% 
increase in capital goods imports resulted in an increase of 0.2% in productivity. In a similar 
way, Yu (2014) suggests that input and output tariff reductions impact positively on 
productivity and are said to contribute 14.5% to economy-wide productivity growth. He 
concludes from his study of large Chinese firms that a 10-percentage point decrease in input 
tariffs resulted to a 5.1% productivity gain. 
On the exports-productivity nexus, Bigsten et al. (1998) discovered from both random 
effects and time-variant productivity models that exporters are more efficient than non-
exporters. Mengistae and Pattillo (2002) corroborate their results with the findings that 
exporting manufacturers’ have a total factor productivity premium of 11- 28 percent in their 
study of three Sub-Saharan African Countries using firm level panel data.  Similarly, studies 
of (Bigsten and Gebreeyesus 2009; Fatou and Choi 2013) have suggested a positive 
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relationship between exporting and productivity in African manufacturing industries. A study 
of manufacturing firms in nine African countries revealed that exporters in those countries were 
more productive and increased their productivity advantage after entry into the export market 
(Van Biesebroeck 2005).  
In a similar way, Bresnahan et al. (2016) found a positive association between export 
intensity and productivity using manufacturing firm-level panel data from four African 
countries (Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania and Nigeria). The results showed that exporting firms were 
in most cases significantly productive than firms selling in the domestic markets. Likewise, 
Hansen (2010b) found that firms that export are 40% more productive than non-exporters. 
Furthermore, Wagner (2005) using firm-level data from 33 countries covering the period 1995 
-2004 found that exporters have higher productivity and are more productive than non-
exporters. In like manner, a study of Japanese firms revealed that firms that export have high 
productivity and those who maintain their foreign presence through exports have even higher 
productivity (Kimura and Kiyota, 2006). In the same way, the results of Aw et al. (2011) in 
their study of Taiwanese firms show that exports have a positive effect on a plant’s future 
productivity.  
In terms of the import status and productivity of firms, Halpern et al. (2015) posit that 
firms that import all input varieties record about 22 percent increase in their revenue 
productivity as shown in their study of Hungarian firms from 1993 to 2002. They also indicate 
that productivity gains from tariff cuts are larger in an economy that has lots of importers and 
foreign firms. They concluded that about one-quarter of productivity growth in Hungarian 
firms during this period was attributed to imported inputs. Likewise, Foster-Mcgregor et al. 
(2013) employing manufacturing firm-level data of 19 Sub-Saharan African countries found 
that on the average, importers were more productive than non-importers. They therefore 
concluded that the costs of importing in the form of import quotas and duties should be reduced 
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to enable less productive firms have access to foreign resources.  Similarly, Fan et al. (2015) 
strongly suggest that access to imported intermediate inputs can substantially increase the 
ability of firms to deliver high-quality goods to foreign markets. On the other hand, high import 
tariffs have been found to discourage capital accumulation by raising the price of imported 
capital goods (Irwin, 2001). This implies that high tariffs and stringent trade barriers are 
detrimental to firm productivity and economic growth in general. 
Empirical Model  
Following Van Beveeren (2012), a two-stage approach is applied in the productivity analysis. 
First, firm-level total factor productivity is estimated based on a production function using the 
Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) methodology. After which the effects of tariffs on total factor 
productivity is examined. For a start, a Cobb-Douglas production function of the form given 
below is considered: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝐴𝑖𝑡𝐿𝑖𝑡𝛽𝑙𝐾𝑖𝑡𝛽𝑘𝑀𝑖𝑡𝛽𝑚                           (1) 
Where itY  is the real gross output in firm i at time t; (Lit), (Kit), (Mit) represent labour, capital, 
and materials respectively for firm i in time t; Ait is the Hicksian neutral efficiency level of the 
firm i in time t and said to be unobservable to the researcher. τ is the key trade policy variable 
(tariff) used in determining whether trade policy is a function of a firm’s productivity. The 
gross output approach is used because the use of intermediate inputs makes it possible to 
capture the complete picture of the production process (Sichel, 2001). Also, unlike the value-
added method which is observed to have higher estimated coefficients and could thus 
overestimate productivity, the gross output approach does not have such a challenge (Gandhi 
et al., 2017). Hence, it serves as “a better indicator of the full extent of disembodied 
technological change” (Cobbold, 2003:2). Taking the natural logarithm of equation (1), the 
following log-linear equation is obtained: 
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𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    (2) 
 
            Where the natural log of the Hicksian neutral efficiency is given as 𝑙𝑛 (𝐴𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡. 
The subscripts i and t denote firm and time (in years) respectively and  𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the time varying 
error. The dependent and input variables are in natural logarithm (the small letters denote that 
variables are in natural logarithm); hence the input coefficients represent input elasticities. 0  
represents a measure of the mean efficiency level across firms and over time and 𝛽𝑙, 𝛽𝑘,𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽𝑚  are the coefficients for labour, capital, and materials respectively. The time varying 
error component,  𝜀𝑖𝑡, can be decomposed into two components as observable and 
unobservable. As a result, equation (2) can be rewritten as follows: 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑞    (3) 
where
 
𝜔𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝜐𝑖𝑡 represents firm level productivity, β are the coefficients to be estimated 
and 𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑞  is an i.i.d. component that refers to the unexpected deviations from the mean resulting 
from measurement errors and other external factors. It is thus seen as the true error, which can 
contain both unobserved, and measurement errors (Arnold, 2005). Estimating equation (3) 
allows for 𝜔𝑖𝑡 to be solved, such that TFP (i.e. the estimated productivity), measured as the 
difference between actual output and the predicted output is obtained as the residual of the 
production function as shown in the following equation: 
?̂?𝑖𝑡 = 𝜐𝑖𝑡 + ?̂?0 = 𝑦𝑖𝑡 − ?̂?𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 − ?̂?𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡 − ?̂?𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡                (4) 
Where:  ?̂?𝑖𝑡 = TFPit 
 ?̂?𝑙, ?̂?𝑘 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ?̂?𝑚, are the estimated factor elasticities for labour, capital and materials 
respectively.  
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The estimated TFP equation allows for the evaluation of the impacts of various policy 
variables at the firm level (Van Beveeren 2012). Therefore, to determine the influence of tariffs 
as a trade policy instrument on firm productivity, the following equation is estimated:   
ln TFP𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1(𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓) + 𝛽′𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡                                      (5) 
Where: ln TFPijt is determined from equation (4) and refers to the log total factor productivity 
at the firm level. Tariff is given as the average bilateral tariff at the International Standard 
Industrial Classification (ISIC) at the 3-digit level (See Table A.1 for the categorization of 
firms as per the ISIC). Xijt = vector of firm characteristics (firm ownership type, size), t =time 
specific effect; i = firm specific effect such as management quality; 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 = unobserved 
productivity; α and 𝛽’ = parameters to be estimated. The year effect has been included to absorb 
shocks in the economy such as technological changes that might affect productivity.  
         In line with trade stylized facts in the literature and the objectives of this paper, the effects 
of other trade variables such as import, or export status of firms have been assessed with the 
equation below: 
lnTFP𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1(𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓) + 𝛼2( 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 ) + 𝛼3(𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓 × 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒)+ +𝛼5(𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒) + 𝛽′𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡                        (6 ) 
Where export_share = share of a firm’s export to output; import_share = share of raw materials 
imported; tariff * import_share is the interaction of tariff and import_share and all other 
variables are as previously defined in equation (5).  
Equations 5 and 6 are estimated by means of fixed effects (FE) and system GMM. The 
use of the FE estimator solves any possible endogeneity issues relating to tariffs and 
productivity. The fixed effects estimation assumes that unobserved productivity is plant-
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specific but time-invariant. In other words, unobserved productivity is assumed to be constant 
over time. A Hausman test was performed to choose between fixed and random effects model; 
the test results showed that fixed effects was consistent. According to Ackerberg et al. (2007), 
the use of only the within-firm variation in the sample allows the fixed effect estimator to 
overcome the usual simultaneity bias. Consequently, the possibility of trade policy endogeneity 
in the data was taken care of since input endogeneity problems are completely addressed by 
the fixed effects estimator (Ackerberg et al., 2007). The fixed effects estimator is further 
preferred because it controls for any omitted variables bias unlike the random effects, which 
only reduces standard errors, but not bias.  
            The system GMM is used to avoid any possible serial correlation in the TFP estimation 
(Fernandes, 2007). It also solves the simultaneity and selection biases associated with the OLS 
estimator (Van Beveren, 2012). The system GMM estimates are obtained with xtabond2, a 
user-written command by Roodman (2009) because of its “ability to ‘collapse’ instruments to 
limit instrument proliferation” (Roodman, 2009:87). Also, it is preferred in the current paper 
because our dataset consists of short periods and larger observations (that is, small T, large N) 
and xtabond2 is said to be the best choice when the panel has a short period of time.   
Data and Descriptive Statistics 
For the empirical analysis, we use secondary firm-level data of private manufacturing firms in 
Ghana from 1991 to 2001. The data was sourced from the Ghana Manufacturing Enterprises 
Survey (GMES) dataset. The dataset has information on output, intermediate inputs, 
employment, capital, wages, trade status (i.e., imports and exports), firm ownership (Ghanaian, 
foreign, and mixed) at the firm-level. The firms are located in four cities of Ghana: Accra, Cape 
Coast, Kumasi and Takoradi. For our measure of trade liberalization, we use average annual 
tariffs from the Center for Prospective Studies and International Information (CEPII) 
Tradeprod dataset for the periods 1991 to 2001 (See Table A.2 in appendix). In the end, we 
12 
 
employ an unbalanced panel comprised of 145 firms and 1,173 observations in four subsectors 
covering a minimum of three and a maximum of eleven years (see Table A.3 in appendix for 
the data composition). In view of the fact that an unbalanced panel is used, we implicitly take 
care of firm entry and exit, therefore dealing with selection bias.  
 To avoid estimating any spurious relationship between tariffs and firm productivity, a 
unit root test was carried out. Our dataset contains gaps; hence we use the Fisher-type test based 
on Phillips–Perron unit-root test as it is suitable for unbalanced datasets with gaps and also 
robust to both serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. The null hypothesis of the Fisher-type 
Phillips–Perron unit root test (H0) is: All panels contain unit roots, while the alternative 
hypothesis (Ha) is: At least one panel is stationary. From the results obtained as shown in Table 
A.4 in the appendix, we can reject the null hypothesis (since a p-value < 0.05 was obtained) 
and conclude that the dataset is stationary. Hence, each variable used follows a stationary 
process.  
The summary statistics of the key variables employed are presented in Table 1. Over 
the period, the average total factor productivity of all firms (lnTFP_firms) was approximately 
3.2% and that of fully owned Ghanaian firms (lnTFP_Ghanaian) was about 1.5%. On firm 
ownership, as high as 83% of firms were fully owned by Ghanaians. About 42% of firms import 
raw materials and an average of only 10% were engaged in exports during the periods 
considered, a characteristic of most developing countries. With respect to location, most firms 
are found in urban areas as about 56% of the firms constituting the majority were located in 
Accra, the capital of Ghana and another 35% were found in Kumasi, the second largest city in 
Ghana. The remaining 9% were in Cape Coast and Takoradi. On average, about 3% of firms 
exited the market within the 1991 to 2001 period.  
In terms of performance differences among firms with varying trade orientation, the 
descriptive statistics in Table 1 show that the average productivity of local exporting firms (i.e. 
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lnTFP_Ghanaian_exporters) is about 3% compared to 1% for their non-exporting counterpart 
(i.e. lnTFP_Ghanaian_non-exporters) . This falls in line with the general thinking that exporters 
are more productive than non-exporters (Mengistae and Pattillo, 2002; Bigsten et al., 1998). 
On the other hand, indigenous firms (i.e. lnTFP_Ghanaian_importers) engaged in importing 
have an average productivity of about 0.9% as against 3% for non-importing firms (i.e 
lnTFP_Ghanaian_non-importers). This could probably be due to the cost of engaging in 
international markets such as transportation cost, and tariffs that non-importing firms do not 
incur. 
Table 1: Summary Statistics. 
Variable Obs  Mean Std. Dev.             Min          Max 
lnTFP_firms 1,173  3.22 8.23 -17.87 12.46 
lnTFP_Ghanaian  971  1.57 6.92 -10.26 11.80 
lnTFP_GH_importers 378  0.91 6.68 -10.26 11.80 
lnTFP_GH_exporters 85  3.05 5.91 -9.63 11.79 
Imports    1,173  0.42 0.49                0                 1      
Exports 1,173  0.11 0.31 0 1 
Ghanaian 1,173  0.83  0.38 0 1 
Foreign 1,173  0.02  0.15 0 1 
Mixed 1,173  0.15  0.36 0 1 
Any Foreign 1,157  0.17 0.38 0 1 
Exit 1,173  0.04 0.19 0 1 
ln firm size 1,173  3.06 1.26 0 6.24 
Accra 1,173  0.56 0.50 0 1 
Cape Coast 1,173  0.03 0.18 0 1 
Kumasi 1,173  0.35 0.48 0 1 
Takoradi 1,173  0.05 0.23  0 1 
Note: Foreign + Mixed = Any foreign. Hence, either Ghanaian + Any foreign = 1 or Ghanaian + Foreign + 
Mixed = 1. 
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Possible Measurement Issues 
A direct estimation of equation 3 via ordinary least squares (OLS) is problematic since it 
ignores fixed effects, as well as input and output endogeneity and selection bias arising from 
firm entry and exit (Harris & Moffat, 2015). The OLS estimator assumes that the independent 
variables must not correlate with the error term, an assumption often known as “the 
orthogonality of the error term with the regressor” (Antonakis et al. 2010, 1089).  In other 
words, to estimate equation (3) using OLS, the inputs of the production function must be 
exogenous. That is, they must be determined independently from the efficiency levels of the 
firm. However, this is often not the case in practice because the choice of the quantity of a 
firm’s inputs is dependent on a firm’s knowledge of its characteristics or on the amount of 
profit a firm envisage (Marschak and Andrews Jr. 1944). This implies that the independent 
variables are endogenous, that is they correlate with the error term, leading to the problem of 
endogeneity. Hence, estimating equation (3) by means of OLS gives rise to the well-known 
simultaneity bias.  
Simultaneity bias or endogeneity of input choice is said to be the correlation between 
the level of inputs chosen and unobserved productivity shock (De Loecker, 2007). This bias 
stems from the fact that 𝜔𝑖𝑡 is unobserved by the econometrician but known to the individual 
firms. For instance, more productive firms could employ more labour and/or invest in capital 
based on either higher current or anticipated future profits. This could result in the input 
coefficients of the OLS estimation of the production function to be higher than their true values 
(Pavnick 2002). In other words, the OLS estimates can be biased (Van Beveren 2012) either 
upwards or downwards and inconsistent in this case. This can lead to incorrect inferences and 
may result in conclusions that are misleading as well as providing theoretical interpretations 
that are inappropriate (Ullah et al. 2018).   
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Also, a firm may choose to stay or exit the market based on its knowledge of its 
productivity, 𝜔𝑖𝑡. Such knowledge also affects its decisions with respect to hiring of labour, 
purchase of materials, and investment in new capital (Pavnick 2002). In other words, selection 
bias also known as endogeneity of attrition results in a negative correlation between 𝜀𝑖𝑡 and 𝐾𝑖𝑡, leading to a downward bias of the capital coefficient (Van Beveren 2012). Consequently, 
TFP estimates are biased upwards if the exit rule of a firm is ignored (Van Beveren 2012). By 
employing an unbalanced panel in the current paper, we implicitly account for selection bias. 
Additionally, we control for the exit of firms in our productivity analysis, explicitly dealing 
with the endogeneity of attrition problem. 
Another methodological problem associated with the estimation of TFP is the omitted 
output price bias. Such a price bias emanates from the use of deflated sales in place of quantities 
of output in empirical studies. The standard practice in the literature has often been the use of 
deflated firm level revenues as proxy for physical quantity, which is mostly not observed (De 
Loecker 2011). As such, to eliminate price effects, firm level sales or revenue are often deflated 
using industry level price index, rather than firm-level prices (De Loecker 2011). However, 
this introduces an omitted price bias. This is because if inputs are correlated with prices, then 
the coefficients of the production function will be biased. For instance, TFP estimates are 
biased upwards, due to an under-estimation of firm input use, as a result of using industry levels 
prices if firms negotiate lower prices for a given input (Van Beveren 2012).  At the moment 
however, Van Beveren (2012) notes that there is no formal solution to such a bias in the absence 
of firm-level price data. Thankfully, the dataset employed in this study contains firm-specific 
prices, thereby eliminating the omitted price bias.  
The most popular solutions proffered over the years to solve the problem of endogeneity 
have been instrumental variables (IV) and proxy variables approach (Galvao et el. 2017).  The 
use of the IV method in practice has however been very limited due to the extreme difficulty 
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in obtaining appropriate instruments. Hence, Ackerberg et al. (2007) assert that the IV method 
has performed poorly in practice. Therefore, semi-parametric methods, that is the proxy 
variables approach developed by Olley-Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) have been 
considered to offer better solutions to the simultaneity and selection biases inherent in the OLS 
estimator. In both methods, input variables are used as proxies to control for unobserved 
productivity but differ in the type of proxy employed. Whereas the Olley-Pakes (OP) uses 
investment as a proxy, the Levinsohn-Petrin (LP) uses intermediate inputs (materials, energy 
or both) instead. 
Until now, the OP has been the only method accounting explicitly for the exit decisions 
of firms and completely resolving the selection bias that arises from ignoring such decisions 
(Van Beveren, 2012). Nonetheless, practically, the LP estimator has been widely used since 
most firms often report periodic data for intermediate inputs, hence allowing for a greater 
number of observations to be examined with this approach. Following this, the paper employs 
the LP estimator1 to correct for the simultaneity bias.  
Although the OP method has the capability of resolving both the simultaneity and 
selection biases inherent in the TFP estimations (Van Beveren 2012), the usage of only non-
zero investments per period, however, limits the sample size as a lot of firms neither invest nor 
have positive investments annually. In other words, missing or zero investments are common 
trends in real data. The absence of strictly positive periodic investments implies that the zero 
investments must be dropped in order to meet the strictly monotonous relationship between the 
proxy (investment) and output, a key condition of the approach. The resulting effect is a huge 
drop in the number of observations. The demerits of the method are rightly captured in the 
words of (Levinsohn and Petrin 2003, 321) that, “firms that make only intermittent investments 
 
1
 For an overview of the method, see Levinsohn and Petrin (2004). 
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will have their zero-investment observations truncated from the estimation routine (the 
monotonicity condition does not hold for these observations). For manufacturing censuses, this 
can be a large portion of the data”.    
 
Discussion of Results 
Table 2 displays the baseline results of the tariff-productivity nexus based on equation (5) using 
fixed effects estimation. For the entire dataset, the tariff variable is negative and insignificant 
across the four models, implying that tariff reductions are not accompanied by significant 
changes in firm productivity. The results suggest that larger firms perform better than smaller 
ones as the firm size variable is positive and significant as expected. For instance, larger firms 
are about 28% relatively productive in comparison to smaller firms at the highest significance 
level. This supports the evidence by Francis and Honorati (2016) and Bausch and Krist (2007) 
that larger firms are more productive than their smaller counterparts. The baseline findings also 
suggest that firms that exited were about 29% less productive in comparison to firms that 
survived.  
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Table 2: Tariffs and Firm-Level Productivity (Baseline Results) – Fixed Effects 
Estimation.  
Dependent Variable: ln TFP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ln Tariff -0.1285 
(0.1619) 
-0.1119 
(0.1576) 
-0.1177 
(0.1631) 
-0.1016 
(0.1587) 
ln firm size  
 
0.2828*** 
(0.0736) 
 
 
0.2806*** 
(0.0735) 
exit  
 
 
 
-0.3029** 
(0.1273) 
-0.2939** 
(0.1233) 
constant 3.4744*** 
(0.5142) 
2.5756*** 
(0.4756) 
3.4335*** 
(0.5171) 
2.5430*** 
(0.4773) 
year effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1173 1173 1173 1173 
No. of firms   145   145   145   145 
R2 (within) 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.04 
Notes: All estimations contain firm fixed effects and sector effects. Robust standard errors that are clustered at 
the firm level are in parentheses. Significance at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.  
 
In Table 3, the results as per equation (6) are reported. Across the four model 
specifications for firms that are fully or partially foreign owned, the tariff variable is negative 
as expected and statistically significant. This means that for non-indigenous private firms, 
decreasing tariffs are accompanied by an improvement in productivity. For example, model 1 
shows that a 10-percentage point reduction in tariff is associated with a 5.7% improvement in 
productivity at a high significance level for firms with any foreign ownership. This is probably 
because foreign firms responded more positively to decreases in tariffs. Perhaps also, the 
managerial skills of the management, extent of technology, and the type of labour foreign 
owned firms employ could be some reasons for the differences in firm performance between 
foreign and Ghanaian owned firms. The differences in productivity does support the assertion 
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that foreign owned firms are more productive than their local counterparts as found by Amiti 
and Konnings (2007).  
On the other hand, the tariff variable is unexpectedly positive for fully owned Ghanaian 
firms, an indication that higher tariffs are positively related to firm improvement for such firms. 
Nonetheless, such results are not statistically significant in all the four models. Hence, there is 
no concrete significant evidence on the tariff-productivity relationship for local private firms. 
A similar conclusion was drawn by Razzaque et al. (2003) where no significant relationship 
was observed between nominal tariffs and productivity in Bangladesh. The variables on the 
trade status of firms were not significant statistically. In general, the outcome lends credence 
to the assertion that foreign firms benefit the most from trade liberalization (Ferdows, 1997). 
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Table 3: Tariffs and Firm-Level Productivity (All Firms) – Fixed Effects Estimation.  
Dependent Variable: ln TFP 
 Full/Partial Foreign Owned Firms Fully Owned Ghanaian Firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
ln Tariff -0.5678*** 
(0.1843) 
-0.4771*** 
(0.1673) 
-0.4100** 
(0.1818) 
-0.4344** 
(0.1771) 
0.1645 
(0.2014) 
0.1731 
(0.1985) 
0.2486 
(0.1968) 
0.2415 
(0.2012) 
ln firm size  
 
0.3277** 
(0.1359) 
0.3096** 
(0.1391) 
0.3009** 
(0.1369) 
 
 
0.2349*** 
(0.0814) 
0.2312*** 
(0.0788) 
0.2361*** 
(0.0789) 
exit  
 
-0.0970 
(0.1220) 
-0.1123 
(0.1220) 
-0.0996 
(0.1228) 
 
 
-0.1694 
(0.1473) 
-0.1622 
(0.1440) 
-0.1708 
(0.1452) 
ln Ex_share  
 
 
 
0.0166 
(0.0410) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0146 
(0.0319) 
 
 
ln Tariffs*Ims  
 
 
 
-0.0322 
(0.0436) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0355 
(0.0235) 
 
 
ln Im_share  
 
 
 
0.1294 
(0.1424) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0759 
(0.0589) 
 
 
imports  
 
 
 
 
 
0.4729 
(0.6046) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.2432 
(0.2333) 
ln Tariffs*Imd  
 
 
 
 
 
-0.1167 
(0.1950) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.1207 
(0.0936) 
exports  
 
 
 
 
 
0.0936 
(0.1147) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0475 
(0.0851) 
constant 0.8052 
(0.5670) 
-0.7877 
(0.6485) 
-1.0238 
(0.7315) 
-0.9102 
(0.7097) 
0.8774 
(0.6662) 
0.1930 
(0.6377) 
-0.0188 
(0.6190) 
-0.0054 
(0.6346) 
year effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 202 202 202 202 971 971 971 971 
No. of firms  27  27  27  27  118 118 118 118 
R2 (within) 0.13 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.08 
Notes: All estimations contain firm fixed effects and sector effects. Robust standard errors that are clustered at the firm level are in parentheses. ln Tariffs*Imd is an interaction 
term between log tariffs and the import dummy variable and ln Tariffs*Ims is an interaction term between log tariffs and log import share. Models 1 – 4 apply to full/partial 
ownership of firms by foreigners whilst models 5 – 8 relate to fully owned Ghanaian firms. Significance at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.  
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Tariff-Productivity Nexus Based on Firm Characteristics 
Table 4 present results of the impact of tariffs on firm productivity based on ownership. The 
results show that a 10-percentage point reduction in tariffs is significantly accompanied by a 
5.7% and 4.7% increase in productivity for firms with partial or full foreign ownership, and 
mixed owned firms respectively. On the contrary, the tariff variable though negative for fully 
owned Ghanaian firms is not statistically significant. This outcome runs counter to the 
argument that exposure to international trade leads to an increase in the efficiency of domestic 
producers that were previously or initially protected (De Loecker and Goldberg, 2014).  
Table 4: Tariffs and Firm-Level Productivity Based on Firm Ownership   
Dependent Variable: lnTFP 
 Ghanaian Foreign Mixed   
 (1) (2) (3)   
ln Tariff -0.0164 
(0.2011) 
-0.5678*** 
(0.1843) 
-0.4676** 
(0.1888) 
  
constant 3.9502*** 
(0.6427) 
0.8052 
(0.5670) 
-0.3473 
(0.5639) 
  
year effect  Yes Yes Yes   
Observations 971 202 175   
No. of Firms 118  27    23   
R2 (within) 0.03 0.13 0.20   
Notes: Robust standard errors that are clustered at the firm-level are in parentheses. Ghanaian refers to firms fully 
owned by Ghanaians, foreign represents the share of foreign investment in a firm and Mixed applies to firms with 
both foreign and Ghanaian owners. Significance at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.  
 
It appears therefore from Table 4 that tariff reductions in Ghana have been more 
beneficial to foreign firms in comparison to domestic ones. Probably, private indigenous firms 
did not respond adequately to tariff changes in comparison to their foreign counterparts. Indeed, 
the World Bank (1994,78) asserts that manufacturing growth in Ghana was slow in the cause 
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of the economic recovery program due to “lagging private investments”. This could be due to 
supply side constraints such as inadequate access to capital, high cost of borrowing, high cost 
of fuel and inputs, inadequate supply of inputs and inadequate technology. In fact, Aryeetey 
and Tarp (2000) opined that much attention was not paid to identifying what the private sector 
really needed in order to adequately respond to liberalization incentives. Rather, “It was 
assumed that the private sector would respond quickly and smoothly to revised incentive 
structures” targeted at it because of the belief that the public sector crowding out the private 
sector was the major problem (Aryeetey and Tarp 2000,349).  
Since the relationship between tariffs and productivity of Ghanaian firms is 
inconclusive as per the results of Tables 3 and 4, we conduct further analysis focusing only on 
Ghanaian importing firms. This is because importing firms are presumed to benefit the most 
from falling tariffs.  Therefore, in Table 5, the tariff-TFP analysis for Ghanaian firms engaged 
in importing is reported. The tariff variable is negative as expected across all models but 
insignificant, indicating that the results are not robust enough to conclude that tariff changes 
positively impact on the productivity of local importing firms. As a result, the paper does not 
provide strong evidence that declining tariffs are associated with higher productivity for local 
firms that import. Hence, a learning by importing effect for fully owned Ghanaian firms cannot 
be confirmed.  
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Table 5: Tariffs and Firm-Level Productivity of Ghanaian Importing Firms 
Dependent Variable: ln TFP (Ghanaian firms) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
ln TFP t-1 1.0450*** 
(0.0458) 
1.0302*** 
(0.0369) 
1.0385*** 
(0.0358) 
ln Tariff t-1 -0.6819 
(0.5182) 
-0.4930 
(0.4436) 
-0.6851 
(0.4192) 
firm size 0.0039 
(0.0049) 
0.0015 
(0.0040) 
0.0023 
(0.0025) 
exit -0.0536 
(0.1491) 
0.0454 
(0.1317) 
0.0087 
(0.1352) 
year effect  Yes Yes Yes 
N 322 322 322 
No. Firms 82 82 82 
Instruments 17 20 23 
AB 1(p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AB 2 (p-value) 0.21 0.20 0.22 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.90 0.37 0.61 
Notes: The instruments for specifications for all columns are differenced equation, ln Tariff and ln TFP lagged 1 
period, differenced year dummies; levels equation, first difference of the first lags of ln Tariff and ln TFP. Lag 
limits are (1 1) for model 1; (1 2) for model 2; (1 3) for model 3. Robust standard errors in parentheses. AB  1 and 
2 are tests for first- and second- order serial correlation. Significance at * 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1%. 
An analysis of the tariff-productivity nexus of Ghanaian firms based on firm size, 
measured by the number of employees in each firm is reported in Table 6. Firms are grouped 
into four categories: micro, small, medium, and large enterprises2.  Micro firms are defined as 
firms with less than six employees; small firms are firms with an employee size of 6 to 19; 
firms with 20 to 75 employees are termed as medium; and large firms are defined as those with 
more than 75 employees.  
 
2
 The definitions are in line with, they are part of the team that compiled the RPED GMES dataset. 
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For micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) that are fully owned by Ghanaians, 
the tariff variable is positive, meaning that higher tariffs are associated with higher productivity 
whilst lower tariffs are associated with lower productivity. The results are however statistically 
significant only for micro firms. For example, a 10-percentage point decrease in tariffs is 
associated with 11.7% decline in firm productivity of micro Ghanaian firms. In effect, 
Ghanaian micro firms are more productive with rising tariffs. In other words, indigenous micro 
firms are unable to perform well in terms of their productivity with increased competition due 
to trade. Subsequently, this outcome conforms to the infant industry argument that indigenous 
firms must be protected from foreign competition by way of imposing higher tariffs until they 
are able to grow, expand and can compete or withstand foreign competition. Nonetheless, the 
results point to the lack of competitiveness of local firms.  
Table 6: Tariffs and Firm-Level Productivity of Ghanaian Firms Based on Size  
Dependent Variable: lnTFP (Ghanaian Firms) 
 Micro Small Medium Large 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ln Tariff 1.2057*** 
(0.3665) 
0.1551 
(0.3577) 
0.2140 
(0.2522) 
-0.1413 
(0.6222) 
exit -0.1275 
(0.3703) 
-0.3322* 
(0.1790) 
-0.0907 
(0.0953) 
0.3303 
(0.6579) 
constant 0.5311 
(1.2323) 
0.6993 
(1.2091) 
0.0512 
(0.8229) 
-0.2487 
(2.0381) 
year effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 158 382 333 98 
No. of firms 38 74 64 19 
R2 (within) 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.12 
Notes: Robust standard errors that are clustered at the firm level are in parentheses. Ghanaian firms refer to firms 
fully owned by Ghanaians. Significance at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.  
 
In Table 7, results on the relationship between tariffs and firm level productivity using 
the system GMM estimation as per equation (6) are presented. Tariffs, the variable is negative 
and statistically significant in the first model only for the entire dataset. The significant model 
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implies that declining tariff rates result in increases in firm productivity. Particularly, a 10-
percentage point reduction in tariffs is seen to cause an improvement in firm productivity of 
about 13% at the 10% significance as depicted in model 1. Nevertheless, the effect is weak 
especially that the results of the other three models are insignificant.  
For fully owned Ghanaian firms, the tariff variable is positive across the four models 
and significant only for model 3 at the 10% level. That is, for local firms, a reduction in tariffs 
is accompanied by a decline in productivity of around 7.4%. Nonetheless, the results are not 
strong enough to conclude that lower tariffs indeed do induce lower firm productivity in locally 
owned firms because of the statistical insignificance of the other model results. In terms of firm 
size and productivity, a positive but insignificant relationship is observed. The import dummy 
and import share variables of fully owned Ghanaian firms are observed to be negative, 
indicating that firms that import or have a higher share of imports are not better performing in 
terms of their productivity than non-importers. However, these conclusions are rather weak 
since the results obtained are not significant statistically. 
The p-values of the Hansen test for the null hypothesis of the validity of the overidentifying 
restrictions reported at the bottom of Table 7 are greater than 0.1 in all specifications. Hence, 
across all the model specifications, we do not reject the null hypothesis. In addition, we present 
the p-values for the AR (1) and AR (2), which are the test for first- and second- order 
autocorrelation respectively. The p-values of the AR (1) are significant across all 
specifications, indicating a high first order autocorrelation as expected. Lastly, there is no 
evidence of a significant second order autocorrelation in all specifications as per the p-values 
of the AR (2) reported in Table 7. Therefore, we can conclude that the test statistics reported 
hint at a proper specification.  
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In a nutshell, the System GMM estimations reveal a weak positive relationship between 
tariffs and firm productivity of local firms whereas the FE estimations did not depict any 
significant impact. Therefore, the empirical evidence does not show any significant relationship 
between tariffs and firm productivity in the Ghanaian private manufacturing sector. Probably, 
the private sector in Ghana is either not well developed or too small to take advantage of trade 
incentives. It is also possible that the private sector did not react much to trade incentives 
because they felt they were not adequately consulted during the period of the economic reforms 
(Tangri, 1992). Indeed, Tangri (1992:110) reports that a former president of the Ghana 
Employers’ Association mentioned that “For private investors, their supply response will be 
affected by the extent of opportunities made available for consultation and participation” by 
the state.
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Table 7: Tariffs and Firm-Level Productivity - System GMM Estimation. 
Dependent Variable: ln TFP 
 All Firms Fully Owned Ghanaian Firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
ln TFP t – 1  0.8096*** 
(0.0885) 
0.9313*** 
(0.0577) 
0.8840*** 
(0.0835) 
0.9085*** 
(0.0847) 
0.9241*** 
(0.0365) 
0.9262*** 
(0.0381) 
0.9275*** 
(0.0363) 
0.9441*** 
(0.0320) 
ln Tariff t – 1 -1.3725* 
(0.8245) 
-0.5168 
(0.5802) 
-0.9071 
(0.7713) 
-0.7029 
(0.6477) 
0.7453 
(0.4622) 
0.7575 
(0.4605) 
0.7411* 
(0.4451) 
0.4970 
(0.3922) 
ln firm size  
 
0.1251 
(0.1882) 
0.1138 
(0.1837) 
0.0356 
(0.1854) 
 
 
0.0657 
(0.1451) 
0.0660 
(0.1411) 
0.0998 
(0.1238) 
exit  
 
-0.0460 
(0.2162) 
0.0529 
(0.1784) 
-0.0220 
(0.1523) 
 
 
-0.0061 
(0.1356) 
0.0053 
(0.1332) 
0.0079 
(0.1289) 
imports  
 
 
 
0.0971 
(0.1109) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.1054 
(0.1094) 
 
 
ln Im_share  
 
 
 
 
 
0.0914 
(0.1209) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.1454 
(0.0898) 
ln Tariffs*Ims  
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0193 
(0.0412) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0441 
(0.0313) 
ln Ex_share  
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0539 
(0.0538) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0095 
(0.0379) 
year effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 969 969 969 969 795 795 795 795 
No. of Firms 145 145 145 145 118 118 118 118 
Instruments 0 16 0 26 0 23 0 23 0 14 0 17 0 19 0 23 
AB 1 (p-value)  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AB 2 (p-value)  0.33 0.69 0.49 0.55 0.52 0.54 0.55 0.51 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.35 0.15 0.28 0.10 0.67 0.22 0.34 0.46 
Notes: The instruments for specifications for all columns are: differenced equation, ln Tariff lagged 1 period, lnTFP lagged 1 period, imports, ln Im_share, ln Ex_share, ln 
Tariffs*Ims, ln firm size and exit, differenced year dummies; levels equation, first difference of first lag of Tariffs, first lag of TFP, imports, ln Im_share, ln Ex_share, ln 
Tariffs*Ims, ln firm size and exit. Lag limits for model 1 and 3 are (1 2); model 2 (1 4) and (1 1) for models 4 to 8. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Models 1 to 4 apply 
to the entire dataset whilst models 5 – 8 relate to only fully owned Ghanaian firms. AB 1 and 2 are tests for first- and second- order serial correlation. Significance at * 10%, 
** 5%, and *** 1%. 
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Conclusion 
In this paper, we try to investigate the relationship between tariff reductions and firm 
productivity of the manufacturing sector in Ghana. The findings suggest that tariff reductions 
do not result in productivity improvement for Ghanaian owned private whereas the productivity 
of partial or foreign owned firms improved due to declining tariffs.  The empirical findings fall 
short of supporting the evidence that trade liberalization can increase firm-level productivity 
of local firms via tariff reductions. It however confirms the significance of firm ownership on 
firm productivity.  
For policy makers who are concerned about the potential drawbacks of trade 
liberalization on domestic firms in the developing world, this paper provides great insights. 
First of all, the results reveal that all firms are not affected in the same way as a result of opening 
up via declining tariffs. The extent of effect varies with the size of the firm (that is whether 
micro, small, medium or large) such that the larger the firm, the lesser the negative effect and 
the smaller the firm, the higher the negative impact. In other words, micro and small enterprises 
were negatively affected due to lower tariffs with micro firms being the worst affected as per 
the findings. So, from a policy point of view, rather than implementing wholesale policies, 
policy makers must tailor public policies to the needs of firms based on their characteristics 
such as size and their ability to cope or adjust to increasing competition. 
Also, the current findings raise serious concerns about the impact of liberalizing trade 
on the performance of indigenous owned private firms. On the one hand, it questions the 
significance of trade reforms in stimulating the productivity of private indigenous firms, 
thereby downplaying the calls for further reforms in the form of declining tariffs in developing 
countries like Ghana. More importantly, the negative impact of declining tariffs on the 
productivity of privately-owned Ghanaian manufacturing firms cast doubts on the ability of the 
private sector, particularly in manufacturing to serve as the engine of growth in Ghana. It is 
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therefore necessary that policy makers rethink the idea of ultimately getting rid of tariffs as a 
means to spur growth.  
The results draw attention to strengthening the capabilities of indigenous firms to be 
competitive amid foreign competition. Indeed, the findings point to indigenous firms being 
harmed in terms of their productivity as a result of increased import competition due to falling 
tariffs. This calls for competitive strategies, both at the firm and policy making (government) 
levels to improve the competitiveness of local firms. At the firm-level, Ghanaian firms could 
focus on meeting local demands of consumers, especially that about 90 percent of firms studied 
served only the domestic market. By adapting their products to local preferences such that the 
products appeal to local taste, they could be able to build a market niche and wade off the 
competition from foreign firms. As part of focusing on domestic consumers, indigenous firms 
must improve their customer services by becoming more customer oriented.   
Furthermore, Ghanaian owned firms could improve upon their competitiveness by 
improving the quality of their products. Relative to products of local firms, foreign firms are 
said to produce superior products (Dawar and Frost, 1999). Therefore, to compete with foreign 
firms, products of indigenous firms must possess some quality that is comparative to the 
products of their foreign counterparts. Linked with improving quality is innovation, the absence 
of which slows firm growth. Indeed, the Bank of Ghana (2007) asserts that the lack of 
innovation in the Ghanaian manufacturing sector is a major factor accounting for the weak 
performance of the sector. This is not surprising as R&D investments in Ghana is very little as 
revealed by the World Bank. The latest available data indicates that the country’s R&D 
expenditure as percentage of GDP was 0.4% in 2010, which compares unfavorably to 2.4 % in 
East Asia and Pacific, and 2.7% in North America (World Bank, 2019). Clearly, the spending 
on research and development is woefully inadequate and the private sector must commit more 
resources to such activities if they want to be competitive enough in a global environment. 
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To conclude, encouraging joint ventures or partnerships between foreigners and 
Ghanaians could allow for more domestic firms to stay more productive and thus benefit from 
trade liberalization especially as the key targets of trade reforms. In addition, investment in 
education, technology and quality of labour force by domestic firms could better position them 
to respond adequately to trade reforms and thus accrue the expected gains from such reforms. 
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Appendix 
Table A.1: Firm Classification into Subsectors Based on ISIC (Rev. 2). 
ISIC Code Description Abbreviation 
312 Food products Food 
313 Alcohol Beverages 
322 Wearing apparel Garment 
332 Furniture except metal Furniture 
381 Fabricated metal products Metal 
382 Machinery except electrical Machines 
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Table A.2: Average Tariffs 
Year Food Garments Furniture Metal Beverages Machines 
1991 20.45 33.3 23.64 22.19 18.63 13.00 
1992 21.42 27.27 20.53 18.8 50.00 11.98 
1993 14.26 22.15 14.93 14.78 23.67 8.51 
1994 23.71 30.35 21.8 21.5 38.97 14.11 
1995 17.33 22.4 13.45 12.12 55.74 5.75 
1996 12.54 14.36 6.82 6.95 21.94 3.52 
1997 20.13 25.14 17.76 16.69 31.52 8.34 
1998 14.71 18.48 13.49 12.17 31.97 7.17 
1999 14.16 16.81 11.39 11.15 24.34 6.32 
2000 14.48 18.46 11.1 10.5 21.65 4.46 
2001 12.38 25.87 15.75 13.55 44.51 5.45 
Source: De Soussa et al. (2012). 
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Table A.3: Data Composition by Sector. 
Sector No. of firms No. of Observations                Percent (%) of Obs. 
Food & Beverages 26 201 17.14 
Garments 39 315 26.85 
Furniture 37 305 26.00 
Metal & Machines 43 352 30.01 
Total 145 1,173 100.00 
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Table A.4: Unit Root Test of Key Variables. 
Variable Z statistic Z statistic(demeaned) 
  Level First Difference Level First Difference 
ln TFP -6.8616*** -7.0102*** -5.6422*** -6.6672*** 
ln Tariff -16.0511*** -17.5250*** -9.8705*** -10.3637*** 
ln gross output -3.3880*** -4.2293*** -5.7610*** -6.1368*** 
ln Materials -3.3286*** -3.6346*** -5.9405*** -6.5877*** 
ln Capital -11.7847*** -12.4234*** -9.5913*** -10.0297*** 
ln Labour -4.0250***  -4.5662*** -8.8761*** -8.9297*** 
ln Indirect cost -9.3004*** -9.5937*** -9.5437 *** -9.9421 *** 
ln Firm size -1.6891** -2.3995*** -6.3952*** -6.8751*** 
import share -1.6567** -1.6565** -13.3830*** -13.5891*** 
T*import share -3.2833*** -3.3002*** -7.8523*** -8.7714*** 
  
 
